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COMMENT
DEBT FOR NATURE SWAPS: AN
INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE
SOLUTION TO A PRESSING GLOBAL
PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
The tropical rain forests' are a crucial element in the
world's delicate ecological balance. The ongoing studies of the
organisms they contain indicate that the rain forests constitute
an extensive reserve of plant and animal species with high po-
tential value to mankind. The rain forests also play an impor-
tant part in maintaining the water and atmospheric gas cycles
that preserve the world climatic balances.
Nevertheless, the world's rain forests are being destroyed at
a rapid pace by fire, 2 indiscriminate logging,3 and land clearing
for agricultural purposes." This destruction has led to dramatic
consequences, among which are the widespread elimination of
plant and animal species,' the lowering of river beds,6 soil im-
poverishment,7 and a worsening of the the "green house effect."8
Tropical rain forests are closed-cover systems characterized by high quantities of
nutrients locked in their biotic community as compared to the smaller quantities of nu-
trients found in their soil. Tropical rain forests also contain very high species diversity
and relatively constant physical environmental conditions. See GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IM-
PACT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, 292 (1986).
' See Stevens, Research in "Virgin" Amazon Uncovers Complex Farming, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at C12, col. 3.
3 Id.
4 Id.
• Shabecoff, Loss of Tropical Forests is Found Much Worse Than Was Thought,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990 at Al, col. 1.
' World Resources Institute, Tropical Forests: The Plan at 7 (1985).
7 Bertrand, Ecological Processes and Life Support Systems, in SUSTAINING DEVEL-
OPMENT 30 (Thibodeau & Field ed. 1984).
' The "greenhouse effect" refers to the increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide
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A complex array of local factors of varying significance in
different countries combine to destroy rain forests. These factors
include: unregulated commercial exploitation, social and
political pressure on governments to clear land for agriculture,
and failure to apply appropriate technologies that permit
nondestructive use of natural resources.
Although individual instances of rain forest destruction may
have local causes, the impetus for deforestation as a whole arises
from international economic events. The economic development
strategies of most Third World nations foresee rapid industriali-
zation through substantial infusions of borrowed capital.' When
a borrowing nation lacks an internationally competitive indus-
trial base, international lenders may expect loans to be repaid
from accelerated exports of agricultural products and raw mater-
ials. Consequently, pressure builds to tap the wealth of the rain
forest, mistakenly treated as inexhaustible.
The developing countries' extensive borrowing led to a more
immediate, if not more dramatic, problem than global deforesta-
tion: the debt crisis. The debt crisis, a de facto recognition that
sovereign borrowers were simply unable to service their foreign
debt, resulted from a rapid deterioration of the developing coun-
tries' terms of trade.' 0 This started essentially as a borrower's
problem, but it became a lender's crisis as it threatened the sta-
bility of the international financial system. Yet, a lender's op-
tions to resolve the crisis are considerably limited by the com-
plexity and uncertainty of legal remedies for sovereign
defaults."
and other gases that hold heat in the lower atmosphere, allowing temperatures to rise.
See BROWN, STATE OF THE WORLD (1989). "The warming of the earth's climate is an
environmental catastrophe on a new scale, with the potential to violently disrupt virtu-
ally every natural ecosystem and many of the structures and institutions that humanity
has grown to depend on. . . . Conditions essential to life as we know it are now at risk."
Id. at 8.
' Escridge, Les Jeux Sont Faits: Structural Origins of the International Debt Prob-
lem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 318 (1985).
"Terms of trade" refers to the acquisition power that a nation's exports yield as
compared to the cost of a given package of imports. In the mid-1970s, the amount of
industrial goods that developing countries could obtain for a given quantity of their com-
modities dropped dramatically; that is, their terms of trade placed them at great disad-
vantage vis-A-vis the industrialized countries. See MOFFAT, ECONOMICS DICTIONARY 299
(2d ed. 1983).
" See generally Note, Default on Foreign Sovereign Debt: A Question for the
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Debt for nature exchanges are promising, though still un-
heralded, 12 banking transactions that seek to integrate a seem-
ingly viable alternative to deforestation with a partial solution to
the debt crisis. This comment describes the mechanisms of debt
for nature exchanges and the benefits they bring to the various
participants. It also identifies the requirements for their success-
ful implementation and the prospects of their future expansion.
In seeking these limited objectives, Part I of this comment
discusses the importance of the rain forest to the world's ecologi-
cal balance; Part II discusses the magnitude of the ecological
disaster that deforestation represents; Part III explores the links
between the debt crisis and deforestation; Parts IV and V deal
respectively with the scarcity of legal remedies for sovereign de-
faults and the viability of debt exchanges as an alternative non-
legal solution; Part VI discusses the Costa Rican debt exchange
program as a case model; and Part VII discusses the current
support for debt for nature exchanges from the United States
Congress and outlines some of the existing barriers to their fur-
ther utilization. A better understanding of debt for nature ex-
changes, as well as the international context within which they
have evolved, might contribute to their successful utilization and
greater acceptance in the future.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RAIN FOREST
The tropical rain forests of the world comprise only about
seven percent of its surface, yet they contain the largest known
reserve of plant and animal species. 13 The rain forests are home
for ninety percent of the world's primates, eighty percent of the
insects and over fifty percent of the plants. 4 A typical four
square-mile section of rain forest contains "1,500 species of
flowering plants, 750 species of trees, 125 different mammals,
Courts?, 18 IND. L. REV. 959 (19"5).
" Currently debt for nature exchanges amount to approximately $100 million, or
slightly less than .01 percent of a total Third World debt of $1.2 trillion. For a break
down of debt for nature transactions see Fuller, Debt for Nature Swaps, 23 ENVTL. SCL
TECHN. 1450 (1989) (Kathryn Fuller is president of the World Wildlife Fund (U.S.) and
The Conservation Foundation).
"3 Cerri, La CEE en Croisade pour sauver les forts tropicales; Liberation (Paris),
Aug. 17, 1989, at 6 (Paris, Fr.).
" Jeffries, Call of the Wild, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 19, 1989, at 38.
1990]
3
PACE Y.B. INT'L L. [Vol. 2:135
400 species of birds, 100 of reptiles, 60 of amphibians and 150 of
butterflies."'" Life in the rain forests is so rich and diverse that
"only a fraction [of rain forest resources] has ever been properly
catalogued."16
The present and potential benefits that this vast cornucopia
represents for mankind are, therefore, considerable. One fourth
of all the drugs prescribed in the United States originate from
rain forest plants.1 7 The forests' genetic pool may well contain
hidden solutions to world hunger and cures to persistent dis-
eases.18 However, virtually all large-scale commercial exploita-
tion of the rain forests depletes their non-renewable resources. 9
This trend may be reversed if, as demonstrated by organizations
such as Cultural Survival,20 sustainable forms of exploitation are
15 Id.
16 Id.
" Id. at 39.
' Booth, Study Offers Hope For Rain Forests, Wash. Post, June 29, 1989, at Al,
col. 1.
19 Sustainable forms of exploitation are those which "promote the maintenance and
restoration of soils, vegetation, hydroelectrical cycles, wildlife, critical ecosystems, biolog-
ical diversity and other natural resources essential to economic growth and human well-
being .. " International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-1240,
§ 512 (b) (4), 1033 Stat. 2492 (codified as amended at 22 USC 2881).
20 "Cultural Survival" is an organization affiliated with Harvard University that pro-
motes rain forest products that can be commercially exploited without endangering the
environment. The rationale behind this initiative is that hope for saving the rain forests
lies not so much in forcing countries to halt exploitation of their natural resources, but in
making 'renewable exploitation profitable.- In the words of research director Jason Clay,
"The idea is to stop saying no to everything in the Amazon and start offering a positive
alternative." Christensen, Saving Brazil's Rain Forests: New Products With a Cause,
San Francisco Chronicle, May 31, 1989, at C1.
Although many stumbling blocks make exports of renewable products from the rain
forests a risky enterprise, marketing efforts in the last two years have brought some suc-
cess. See McCabe, Rain Forest Products, Growing Profits, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1989, at
15. One success story is the sale in New England of an ice cream ("Rain Forest Crunch")
made with Brazilian wild nuts. Another is the sale by a Britsh company of a line of
cosmetics derived from rain forest plants. The latter includes lotions from fragrant roots,
body oils from nuts, soaps from wild flowers, and a tanning agent extracted from red
seeds used by Amazon indians as body paint. In addition, there are plans of future pro-
motion of rattan from Southeast Asia, vanilla from Madagascar, and medicinal extracts
from most of the world's forests. See Marketing the Rainforest, Renewable Products vs.
Short Term Profits, San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 1, 1989, at 21. Support for renewable
(i.e., "sustainable") exploitation of the rain forests has been given new impetus by a
recent study that compares the market value of various renewable and non-renewable
products. The study shows that profits from renewable products can be two to three
times higher than those from products currently exploited through non-renewable meth-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/7
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encouraged. With the use of existing technology, small-scale sus-
tainable exploitation is presently being achieved for fruits, nuts,
and plant extracts used for cosmetics and pharmaceuticals.2
The rain forests also play an important role in maintaining
fresh water supplies because of their capacity to store and return
to the atmosphere billions of gallons of water.2 Although scien-
tists are only beginning to analyze the interactions between rain
forests and world climate, there is substantial consensus that the
destruction of rain forests increases atmospheric carbon dioxide,
accelerating global warming.2 3
The rain forests are a crucial element in the world's delicate
balance of life and their destruction affects all nations. In the
search for means to preserve the rain forests, a first step is to
assess the magnitude of the ecological disaster which can follow
their destruction.
II. THE ECOLoGIcAL DISASTER
Despite their importance to our survival, we are destroying
rain forests at an alarming rate. Indiscriminate logging and land
clearing for pasture and agriculture account for most of these
losses.24 Although figures on the pace of destruction conflict, all
available statistics confirm the severity of the problem. The for-
ests of Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh, for example, have al-
most completely disappeared. It is predicted that if the destruc-
tion continues at its present rate, what forests remain in
Southeast Asia may no longer exist in thirty years.2 5
According to the World-Wide Fund for Nature, 200,000
ods. For example, the present annual value of the products, other than wood, found in a
2.5 acre section of Peruvian forest is approximately $6,820. In contrast, a tree plantation
of the same size yields $3,184, while the yield of cattle grazing in a comparable area is
estimated at $2,960. Valuation of an Amazonian Rain Forest, NATURE, Vol. 339, June
29, 1989, at 655.
21 Seibert, Hug a Tree, Kiss an Herb, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 50.
Ein Aufstand mit Axten und Kettensigen, Der Spiegel, Feb. 17, 1989, at 137
(Hamburg, Ger.) (hereinafter Axten und Ketensdgen).
23 Shabecoff, supra note 5, at B6, col. 1.
2, Stevens, supra note 2.
26 Jeffries, supra note 14, at 38. Latin America has already lost thirty-seven percent
of its original rain forest, while Asia and Africa have lost forty-two percent and fifty-two
percent respectively. Rubinoff, Tropical Forest: Can We Afford Not to Give Them A
Future?, 12 Ecologist 253 (1982).
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square kilometers (approximately 77,000 square miles) of rain
forest are destroyed annually across the globe.26 The figure often
quoted for the Amazon forest alone is nearly 35,000 square kilo-
meters (approximately 14,000 square miles) per year.27 Accord-
ing to data received by the Brazilian Institute for Space and Re-
search from weather satellites, by the end of the summer of 1989
there were nearly 7,000 active fires in the Amazon forest sending
smoke as far as Venezuela and Argentina.28 Biologists have com-
pared the extent of ecological damage that would follow whole-
sale deforestation to that which occurred when the dinosaurs
were obliterated. 29 United Nations Development Program offi-
cials have said that only a nuclear war could equal the long-term
effects of loss of the rain forests.3 0
Using rain forest land for agriculture or pasture has not led
to a net gain in global productivity. First, more than half the
world forests razed annually merely replace degraded agricul-
tural soil." Second, because rain forest soil is relatively poor and
the microclimate that keeps it alive is self-contained, a rain for-
est does not regenerate itself easily.3 2 This problem is particu-
larly aggravated by the "slash and burn" method of agriculture
practiced in most rain forest countries.3 Because most nutrients
28 Axten und Kettenstigen, supra note 22, at 137. According to "World Resources
1990-91," a study published by the World Resources Institute in collaboration with the
United Nations, the rate of loss of rain forests measured for 1987 was nearly 50 percent
greater than that estimated for 1980. The total destruction figure presented by the study
is forty to fifty million acres of tropical rain forest annually. (The 1980 estimate was
prepared by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization). Shabecoff, Loss of
Tropical Forests Is Found Much Worse Than Was Thought, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990,
at Al, col 1.
27 Fearnside, A Prescription for Slowing Deforestation in Amazonia, 31 Env't 16,
17, (1989). See generally Cohen, While Trekking Through the Amazon Senators Learn
not to Mimic Bananas, Wall St. J., Apr. 4,1989, at A19, col. 1; Desjardins, Amazonie: le
drame &cologique; L'inexorable massacre de la fort, Figaro, Mar. 2, 1989, at 7 (Paris,
Fr.).
28 Axten und Kettenstigen, supra note 22, at 136.
29 Jeffries, supra note 14, at 38.
o Axten und Kettensdgen, supra note 22, at 137.
3' Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons From Success, 31 Env't, 7, 8 (1989).
32 Comment, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global Ecolog-
ical Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 539 (1988).
32 The "slash and burn" method consists of cutting, drying and burning forests to
clear the land and release the nutrients. This results in a temporary enrichment of the
soil, but once one or two crops are collected the soil is depleted and erosion sets in. See
Bertrand, Ecological Processes and Life Support Systems, in SUSTAINING TOMORROW 30
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are fixed in living organisms, once the plants are cut and burned,
the remaining thin layer of soil and ashes has minimal produc-
tive value.' Pasture creation, on the other hand, far from being
a land improvement, is "a form of ecological destruction.
35 Soil
in the areas cleared for such purpose is said to be rendered
"compacted and depleted of available phosphorous in about a
decade."" e
In addition to soil depletion there is another problem of
greater dimensions: the warming of the earth's atmosphere. Pre-
sent deforestation practices aggravate the "greenhouse effect"3 7
because more carbon dioxide is released from the massive burn-
ing of forest while fewer trees remain to remove carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere.3 8
Yet, the most serious consequence of rain forest destruction
is the increasing elimination of plant and animal species and the
reduction of the genetic pool for those remaining.3 Scientists es-
timate that approximately 10,000 species of plants and animals,
many of them not yet classified, vanish each year as a result of
deforestation. 0 This involves the elimination of organisms that
could become new sources of food, drugs or raw materials, or
that can yield information and understanding useful for improv-
ing our quality of life. As expressed by Daniel Janzen, a biologist
doing research on the Amazon forest, "[I]t is as if the nations of
the world had decided to burn their libraries without even look-
ing to see what was in them." 1
The scientific consensus is that deforestation is not just a
regional problem, but a global one affecting many issues related
(Thibodeau & Field ed. 1984).
4 Id.
31 Fearnside, supra note 27, at 18.
36 Id.
31 See supra note 8.
38 Scott, The Disappearing Forests, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Jan. 12, 1989, at 34. See
also, Davis, Vast Environmental Changes on Earth Are Recorded in NASA Shuttle
Photos, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1989, at B4, col. 5.
31 Cerri, La CEE en croisade pour sauver les forts tropicales, Liberation, Aug. 17,
1989, at 6 (Paris, Fr.).
40 Scott, supra note 38, at 34. Because of animal dependency on plants, it is esti-
mated that 10 animal species disappear for each plant species that is eliminated. See
Jeffries, supra note 14, at 39. See also Swire, Tropical Chic, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 30,
1989, at 20.
" Tropical Forests: An Endangered Species, World Press Rev., May 1989, at 36.
1990]
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to life on earth. Thus, the rapid destruction of the rain forests
has been called, appropriately, "a catastrophe that compromises
all biological equilibrium on the planet."'
III. UNDERLYING FORCES OF DEFORESTATION: THE LINK WITH
THE DEBT CRISIS
In most instances, the immediate causes of deforestation are
peculiar to each individual country possessing a rain forest. The
spectrum of local forces at play includes landless peasants strug-
gling to survive, 3 land speculation schemes,4 4 unregulated ex-
ploitation of raw materials and mineral resources,4 5 harnessing
42 Desjardins, Amazonie: le drame cologique; L'inexorable massacre de la for&t,
Figaro Mar. 2, 1989, at 7 (Paris, Fr.).
, Breck, Rain Forests for Rent?, Newsweek, Dec. 5, 1988, at 12. The efforts in Bra-
zil to unionize rubber tappers and nut farmers by one particular popular leader, Chico
Mendes, culminated in his murder at the hands of pistoleiros, paid gunmen, on contract
from rubber barons and land speculators. The plight of the indians and the traditional
settlers, widely exposed as a result of Chico Mendes' death, presents a stark contrast
with the quick fortunes made by outside tycoons. This constant struggle is representa-
tive of the social forces underlying the rain forest exploitation policies of Brazil. For an
incisive analysis of that struggle see Hecht & Cockburn, Land, Trees and Justice, De-
fenders of the Amazon, Nation, May 22, 1989; see also REVKIN, THE BURNING SEASON:
THE MURDER OF CHICO MENDES (1990).
4 Lutzenberger, The Systematic Demolition of the Tropical Rain Forest in the
Amazon, 12 Ecologist 248 (1982). In Brazil, for example, land speculation in the Amazon
region is promoted by the Government's recognition of clearing land for pasture as an
"improvement," thus qualifying it for title. As a result of this policy, "every wild settler
cuts down as much forest as he can, often more than the area he can cultivate with crops
.... As soon as they get title or sufficient proof of property, more often than not they
sell to big outfits and move on." Id. at 249. See also Cockburn, Amazon Symbiosis: So-
cial Justice and Environmental Protection, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1988, at A7. In describ-
irg the link between the development strategies adopted by Brazil's previous military
regimes and deforestation, Cockburn wrote:
What the generals started was a land boom, in which cattle have been an
incidental decoration. The big entrepreneurs, followed by small-timers by the
thousands, chopped down trees because they were offered land concessions, sev-
enty-five percent of the capital cost of development, loans at negative interest
rates, tax breaks of up to 100% for seventeen years.
Id.
41 In Southeast Asia, large-scale Japanese consumption is the force behind the ex-
tensive exploitation of timber and other raw materials. Tropical Forests, supra note 41,
at 37. "Already Thailand has gone from an exporter to an importer of timber, and the
Philippines' timber trade is down to a trickle." Scott, supra, note 38, at 34. Commercial
logging is also one of the main forces of forest destruction in the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and
Ghana. The damage done by the logging companies themselves is compounded by other
factors: "Logging roads, pushed deep into the interior of previously isolated regions,
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/7
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hydroelectric energy,"6 and road construction.'7
However, most of the local factors leading to deforestation
are linked, in varying degrees, to international economic events.
Developing countries continuously struggle to repay the exten-
sive loans provided by multinational banks. Those repayment
burdens have forced the borrower countries to expand their eco-
nomic base through relentless exploitation of their natural re-
sources.'8 In the words of Peter Seligmann, President of Conser-
vation International, "[Tihe global environmental crisis has
been accelerated by tremendous pressures on the developing
world to service its debt."' 9
The debt crisis is a composite of the difficulties experienced
by several developing countries in maintaining their foreign debt
payments and the efforts of the lenders to avoid sovereign de-
faults.50 An understanding of the basic elements of the debt cri-
sis is important in studying debt for nature exchanges because
efforts to solve the crisis have provided both the mechanisms
and the political will that have made these exchanges possible.
The debt crisis originated with rising oil prices in 1973. Be-
tween 1973 and 1982, for example, the less developed countries
(LDCs) had to disburse an additional $260 billion just to cover
open them up to landless colonists, scotching any chances the degraded forests had of
recovering from the logging." The Vanishing Jungle, Ecologists Make Friends with
Economists, EcONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 26.
4" The Balbina Dam, for example, built to the northwest of Manaos, Brazil, has sub-
merged millions of square kilometers for a meager production of 250 megawatts, an
amount of electricity totally insufficient for the local demand. Dawney, L'offensive des
Verts indigne le Brbsil, Figaro, June 7, 1989, at 13 (Paris, Fr.).
4 For an analysis of destruction in Brazil due to highway construction see Com-
ment, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative, Global Ecological Disas-
ter, 18 ENvL. L., 537, 544-546 (1988) (authored by Michael S. Giaimo); Brazil and the
Amazon, It's Our Forest to Burn If We Want To, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989.
48 Many of the settlers of the Amazon forest, for instance, have been forced out from
southern Brazilian states by the spread of large-scale mechanized soya farming. Soya is
an export commodity used "to pay interest on Brazil's $115-billion foreign debt." Cohen,
Amazon Tug-of-War Reaches Fever Pitch, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1989, at A12.
'9 Truell, What Do Monkeys in Bolivia Have to Do With the Debt Crisis?, Wall St.
J., Jan. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 3. See also, U.S. Says Third World Loans Pose Environ-
mental Danger, Investor's Daily, Apr. 26, 1988, at 23.
80 See Meessen, Back to the Market: The Debt Problem in Legal Perspective, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1988); Clark & Gianni, Are There Solutions to the Debt Problem?
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept., 1988, at 9; Corrigan, A Balanced Approach to the LDC Debt
Problem, FED. REs. BANK N.Y.Q. REV., Spring 1988, at 1.
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their oil imports.5 A subsequent world recession and an increase
in dollar interest rates triggered massive borrowing by these
countries to cover their current account deficits.52 To compound
the problem, world recession meant a fall in commodity prices,
the main source of foreign exchange earnings for the LDCs.5s Fi-
nally, a further rise in dollar interest rates, which by 1981 had
reached a high of twenty-one percent, meant a greater increase
in the debtor countries' remittances abroad. 4
The international banking community, itself the recipient of
"recycled petrodollars,"55 was eager to cover the deficits left by
the LDCs' net transfer of resources to the oil-producing and in-
dustrialized countries. The LDCs, on the other hand, were will-
ing to borrow more money in order to avoid, or at least post-
pone, the difficult political and economic decisions called for.
Thus, according to the World Bank, between 1974 and 1982 in-
ternational lending to the LDCs multiplied four times in nomi-
nal terms and doubled in real terms."6
These external factors of the debt crisis must be viewed in
conjunction with development strategies adopted by the LDCs.
Such strategies envisioned growth through significant infusions
of borrowed capital. 7 Given the internal economic bottlenecks
" Eskridge, Les Jeux Sont Faits: Structural Origins of the International Debt
Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 288 (1985).
52 Id. at 294-97
5 Id. at 297.
54 Id. at 298-301.
" Meessen, supra note 50, at 1.
5' IBRD (World Bank), World Development Report 1988, at 27 (1988).
"7 Since the late 1950s, the growth strategies of the LDCs have evolved around three
main models of economic development: modernization, dependency, and global interde-
pendency. See Eskridge, supra note 51, at 352.
The modernization model purports that by following the historical path of the al-
ready developed economies, that is, by imitating the same basic steps they took toward
industrialization, the developing countries eventually will attain the status of mass-mar-
ket societies. The characteristics of such societies would be "sustained and diversified
industrialization, self-perpetuating growth, and middle-class mores and democratic insti-
tutions." Id. at 353. The path to industrialization, however, contains economic traps that
act as barriers to full utilization of resources. Among these traps are illiteracy, overpopu-
lation, inadequate infrastructures, and a low rate of capital formation. An often-chosen
alternative to solve these traps is to provide massive inflows of external capital as a
means to "break the vicious cycle of poverty." Id. at 354.
The dependency model posits that underdevelopment is a permanent state of affairs
fixed by capitalist domination of world markets. The industrialized countries are inter-
ested in perpetuating this relationship because they require subordinate markets and
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/7
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in these countries-that is, abysmal income disparities, unstable
political systems, inadequate infrastructures-it is not surprising
that extensive borrowing failed to generate sustainable growth."
In the absence of viable alternatives, pressure to meet debt ser-
vice payments led to further exploitation of natural resources
without adequate protective measures or long-term planning.
The plight of the LDCs was such that even an increase in
their export of commodities and raw materials to the developed
world was insufficient to maintain debt payments. Beginning
with Mexico in 1982, and continuing with Venezuela, Argentina,
Bolivia, Poland and others, country after country has faced this
problem and taken measures to protect their decreasing balance
of payments. On the other hand, the specter of sovereign de-
faults became more visible on the lenders' horizon, threatening
to disrupt the "stability and solvency of major international fi-
nancial institutions.' '59
International lenders confronted with this problem must re-
alize that the legal remedies available for sovereign defaults are
not only scarce but also complex to pursue. The nature of these
remedies is such that other alternatives for rescuing
nonperforming sovereign loans are attractive to banks. An ac-
areas of investment for their surplus capital. As a way out of this paradigm, the develop-
ing countries adopted import-substitution strategies hoping to generate self-sustained
growth. One problem with this option is that most of the items produced under these
policies are luxuries, and most of the modern sectors producing them rely on imported
technologies. There is, for this reason, "only a relatively weak multiplier effect on the
local economy." Makgetla, External Influences on Third World Debt, 12 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 591, 604 (1989).
The interdependency model incorporates the realities of modern relationships
among states and recognizes the susceptibility of the industrialized countries to the
plight of the less developed. This model takes into account the role of global factors such
as the advent of multinational corporations and the continuing erosion of traditional
frontiers as a result of modern transportation, communications and financial systems.
The interdependency theory recognizes the intricate balance of social and economic
structures and incorporates, as a result, such global concerns as world hunger and the.
environment. Nevertheless, structural inequalities included in the earlier models are still
present. The debt problem, for instance, is seen as the result of the LDCs' "partcipating
in a financial system increasingly stacked against them." Eskridge, supra note 51, at 384.
5" See Breck, supra note 43, at 12. To highlight Brazil's dilemma, it has been ob-
served that it is difficult for a country not to exploit its land richness, not to produce low
cost energy or not to create new agricultural zones when half its territory is empty and it
must create two million new jobs and make debt payments of $12 billion per year.
Dawney, supra note 46, at 13.
"' Makgetla, supra note 57, at 591.
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count of the inadequacies of legal remedies available to interna-
tional lenders is therefore important for studying debt
exchanges.
IV. THE NATURE OF LEGAL REMEDIES FOR SOVEREIGN
DEFAULTS
International lenders encounter several barriers when seek-
ing legal remedies for defaults on their overseas portfolios. In
the United States, where most of the direct or syndicate lending
to developing nations originates, international financial institu-
tions seeking redress for such defaults must act within the
framework of established international law. These lenders must
also contend with the possible adverse position of foreign courts
and legislatures."0
The distinguishing feature of most international loans is
that they are made to sovereign entities whose actions are gov-
erned by a separate body of law. This is true of loans made di-
rectly to a public bank or institution, as well as of loans made to
private or semi-private banks. Because the ability of these bor-
rowers to remit hard currency payments abroad often depends
on each country's central or government bank, and thus on the
government itself, such international lending falls within the
category of "sovereign risk."'
Sovereignty is the normative principle that a state has "ex-
clusive authority over the exercise of government power within
its borders. '6 2 In the United States, the legal precepts emanat-
ing from this principle are embodied in the "act of state doc-
trine," 63 which prohibits review of acts of a sovereign entity by
" An adverse decision by a foreign court would not be reviewable in a United States
court because it would fall within the act of state doctrine. See infra note 90 and accom-
panying text.
" "Sovereign risk" refers to the likelihood that a foreign country, borrowing con-
vertible currency, will pay its obligations on schedule and fully comply with other terms
of the loan agreement. An international lendor who accepts a given sovereign risk will
ultimately depend on the borrowing country's capacity to pay as well as its eagerness to
maintain a favorable credit rating. See HANER & EWING, COUNTRY RISK ASSESSMENT,
THEORY AND WORLDWIDE PRACTICE 113 (1985).
62 Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and International Banking: A Conflict of In-
terests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 456 (1988).
" The act of state doctrine "precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into
the validity of governmental acts of a recognized foreign sovereign committed within its
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the courts."4 Because the theoretical basis of the "act of state
doctrine" stems from the notions of comity and sovereign immu-
nity,6  the two concepts are briefly described here. These de-
scriptions provide a background for a further analysis of the "act
of state doctrine," as well as for a brief assessment of the en-
forceability of favorable judgments that lenders might obtain.
A. Comity
Comity is "the degree of deference that a domestic forum
must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise bind-
ing on the forum."66 While not a rule of law per se, comity is a
customary rule of practical convenience that fosters mutual re-
spect between nations and encourages reciprocity and the pres-
ervation of international law.6
An international lender invoking comity as a means to en-
force a court decision against a foreign sovereign will encounter
several limitations. First, comity is accorded as a courtesy and
not as a matter of right, because "[no domestic forum has an
absolute obligation to enforce foreign interests when they are
fundamentally adverse to their own. . ."" Second, where a
lender has obtained a favorable decision from a court in a for-
eign nation, comity is accorded only if the laws and public policy
of the forum state are not violated. 9 Finally, comity cannot be
invoked to resolve conflicts between foreign and domestic laws.
Such conflicts of laws usually appear in cases where a sovereign
borrower defaults due to foreign payment restrictions imposed
own territory." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (5th ed., 1979).
84 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). For a com-
prehensive analysis of the modern view of the act of state doctrine see Halberstam, Sab-
batino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. For-
eign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985).
"' See Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or losing) by Default: The Act of State Doc-
trine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business Transactions, 19 INT'L
LAW 225 (1985).
, Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and International Banking: A Conflict of
Interests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 458 (1988). Comity was first recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
" See Note, supra note 67, at 458. See also Laker Airways. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d at
937.
89 Note, Allied's Flawed Application of the Act of State Doctrine: Impropriety of
the Doctrine in International Finance, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 253, 256 (1987).
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by a government. These defaults are not uncommon in develop-
ing countries.70
B. Sovereign Immunity
Another significant barrier for an international lender seek-
ing-legal remedies against sovereign debtors is the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which "precludes domestic courts from ex-
ercising personal jurisdiction over foreign states."71 As stated by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,"2 sovereign immunity "is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself."7 3 Histor-
ically, unless the party consented, "foreign states enjoyed abso-
lute immunity from being sued in American courts."7"
Absolute immunity later yielded to a restrictive theory of
immunity by which courts could exercise jurisdiction on sover-
eign matters that involved private or commercial acts. Sovereign
immunity, however, was still granted for all public acts by a
state.76 Because suits concerning public acts by a state usually
had sensitive foreign policy implications, the State Department
had the task of recommending whether a matter fell within the
domain of purely private or commercial acts and was therefore
within the jurisdiction of the courts.76 However, international
loans to a sovereign entity were still considered public acts of
the recipient state and were consequently protected by sovereign
immunity. 77
The State Department discretion ceased in 1976 when Con-
70 See Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in International Credi-
tors' Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAW. 1055, 1056 (1987).
1 Note, Default on Foreign Sovereign Debt: A Question for the Courts?. 18 IND. L.
REV. 959, 965 (1985).
71 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
" Id. at 136.
"' Note, supra note 71, at 965.
7b Id.
71 See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S 985 (1971), where the court held that if the State Department
formally suggested immunity the judiciary would not interfere.
77 See, e.g., Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934 (1965). See also Nichols, The Impact of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act on the Enforcement of Lender's Remedies, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 251, 253 (1982).
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gress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter
FSIA).78 The FSIA "provided a statutory means for obtaining
service upon, and in personam jurisdiction over, a foreign
state. . . ." Generally the FSIA grants immunity to acts of a
sovereign state except when (a) the foreign state has waived im-
munity, (b) the action arises out of a purely commercial activity
of the foreign state, or (c) foreign-owned property in the United
States was obtained in violation of international law.
8 0
Since the adoption of the FSIA, international lenders have
used successfully the waiver and commercial transactions excep-
tions to meet their jurisdictional burden. 1 According to the
FSIA, a sovereign borrower can waive immunity either implic-
itly, as when the foreign state agrees to arbitration in the United
States, or explicitly, as is customarily stated in most loan agree-
ments." Courts routinely accept explicit waivers,83 but are di-
vided regarding implicit ones, particularly if arbitration or
choice of law clauses allow access to courts outside the United
States. The consensus is that implicit waivers are "neither cer-
tain nor predictable, two qualities which lenders like their reme-
dies to have."8
Sovereign borrowing from international financial institu-
tions falls within the FSIA definition of commercial activity.
Consequently, courts have subject matter jurisdiction over most
international loans originating in the United States.85 However,
7 Pub. L. No. 94-583 Stat. 2892 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11
(1982)).
71 Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The Viability of the Act of
State Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 Tex. Int'l L.J. 547, 550
(1983).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1),(2),(3) (1982). The exceptions also cover certain actions
arising out of personal injury or death.
" See generally Kahale, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law Restrictions on
Waivers of Immunity and Submissions to Jurisdiction, 37 Bus LAW. 1549 (1982); Mc-
Cormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the
Act of State Doctrine, 16 L. & PoL. INT'L Bus. 477 (1984); Note, Foreign Sovereign Im-
munity and Commercial Activity, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440 (1983).
82 See Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under International Bank Loan Agreements
With Foreign Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 89, 113 n. 111 and accompanying text (1982).
88 Id. at 112 n.109.
84 Id. at 112.
88 The commercial exception of the FSIA reads in relevant part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
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in addition to subject matter jurisdiction, courts must also have
personal jurisdiction over the sovereign defendant.86 Interna-
tional lenders usually meet this requirement either by previous
consent,87 which is usually stipulated in the loan agreement, or
by the use of "long-arm" statutes in the forum state.8
C. Act of State
The act of state doctrine embodies "the reluctance of the
courts to pass judgment on the actions of foreign sovereigns."8 "
In an action against a sovereign debtor, proper jurisdiction will
not necessarily render the case amenable to the courts. Where
the default results from compliance with the domestic laws of a
sovereign nation, courts are likely to invoke the act of state doc-
trine and abstain from addressing the merits of the case. 0 The
States in any case. . . (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States...
18 U.S.C. § 1605 (a).
When the lending transaction is carried outside the United States, the required di-
rect effect must be sufficient to meet the "minimum contacts standard established in
International Shoe Co. v, Washington, 326 U.S. 310 .. .(1945) and McGee v Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220... (1957)." See Ryan, supra note 80, at 115,
n.126, quoting Decor by Nikkey Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria , 497 F. Supp.
893, 903-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
' See Ryan, supra note 82, at 116. The FSIA prohibits quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a sovereign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(2) (1976).
07 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971) (parties may contract for
the adjudication of a dispute arising out their contract in a specific jurisdiction).
68 In New York, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-citizen
who, either directly or through an agent, "transacts any business within the state." N.Y.
Civ. Prac. L & R § 302 (a)(1) (McKinney 1990). See Ryan, supra note 82, at 117. See
also Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow,
15 BUFFALO L. REV. 61 (1965).
* Note, supra note 69, at 967.
90 The act of state doctrine was first articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where a United States citizen sued
the government of Venezuela for unlawful detention and assault. Recognizing the de-
fendant, who had usurped power through a coup d'6tat, as the de facto President of
Venezuela, the court held that "[elvery sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment of the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Id. at 252.
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act of state doctrine, as it relates to remedies for defaults on
international loans, was first considered by the federal judiciary
in Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco de Credito Agricola de Cartago."
As agent of a syndicate loan involving thirty-nine banks,92 Allied
Bank International sued one of three public Costa Rican banks
that had signed promissory notes in favor of the lenders. The
defendant bank failed to make repayments on the loan following
a Costa Rican Government decision suspending foreign exchange
remittances abroad.93 The District Court denied Allied's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the action. On appeal, the
Second Circuit applied the act of state doctrine and upheld the
District Court decision. The court observed that a decision in
favor of the lenders would "constitute a judicial determination
that defendants must make payments contrary to the directives
of their government." '94
The international banks were alarmed by the implications
of this decision. They feared more defaults as sovereign borrow-
ers adopted new foreign exchange controls in response to eco-
nomic pressures. Amidst this concern, plaintiffs petitioned for a
rehearing and enlisted the assistance of the United States Gov-
ernment, which filed an amicus curiae brief. Upon rehearing, the
Circuit Court vacated its earlier decision, found the act of state
doctrine inapplicable, and remanded to the District Court for
See generally Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325
(1986); Note, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United
States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1985);
Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated Prop-
erty, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901 (1985); Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tran-
quility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967).
91 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.) cert. dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 30 (1985). For a detailed discussion of this case see Note, The Act of State
Doctrine and Allied Bank, 31 VILL. L. REV. 291 (1986). See also Note, Allied's Flawed
Application of the Act of State Doctrine: Impropriety of the Doctrine in International
Finance, 20 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 253 (1987); Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and its Af-
termath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819 (1986); Zaitzeff & Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the
Allied Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985).
" Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 516. The District Court obtained personal jurisdiction
by consent, as stipulated in the promisory notes. In addition, the notes were payable in
United States dollars in New York which would have placed the defendants under the
state's long-arm statutes. Randell, The Allied Bank Case and Its Aftermath, 20 INT'L
LAW. 819, 821 (1986).
"3 See Randell, supra note 92, at 822.
14 Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1444.
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summary judgment in favor of Allied Bank.95 The Circuit Court
held that the act of state doctrine was "applicable to this dis-
pute only if, when the decrees were promulgated, the situs of the
debt was Costa Rica."96 The court concluded that the facts of
the case indicated otherwise: the Costa Rican banks had con-
ceded jurisdiction in New York, payment was in United States
dollars in New York, and the syndicate agent was located in the
United States, where some of the negotiations also were con-
ducted."7 Based upon these facts, the court held that the defend-
ants could not invoke the protection of the act of state
doctrine. 8
D. Enforceability of Judgments
The Allied Bank decision created a favorable precedent for
international lenders initiating default actions against sovereign
debtors or against private debtors that alleged governmental re-
strictions.9 However, enforcing the judgments still remains a
major obstacle for the lenders.
Since reciprocal enforcement of a United States judgment
'8 Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519.
Id. at 521.
97 Id.
" Id. at 522. The court also found that the Costa Rican government directives were
"inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems," and that the
restrictions on payments of foreign obligations were "similarly contrary to the interests
of the United States, a major source of private international credit."
'9 Courts have imposed various limitations on the act of state doctrine: (a) that the
acts of the sovereign must be done "within its own territory," Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250 (1897); (b) that the executive branch does not object to a judicial examina-
tion of the sovereign's act, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d
246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); and (c) that it not be a private commer-
cial act of the sovereign state, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republica de Cuba, 425
U.S. 682 (1975). There is also an important legislative exception, the "Hickenlooper
Amendment," which bars application of the act of state doctrine in cases of confiscation
of property by a foreign sovereign "in violation of the principles of international law."
Hinckenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)
& Supp. IV (1987). See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of
Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INT'L L. J. 677 (1977); Dellapenna, Suing
Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of Law, 87 CoM. L. J. 8 (1982);
Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Ques-
tion Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 722 (1983); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of
the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 599 (1980); Note, Limiting the
Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1982).
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by a court in the defendant's country is unlikely, the only viable
alternative would be execution on the defendant's property
within the United States. 100 Yet this option may be precluded if
(a) the defendant removes the property from the jurisdiction in
anticipation of an adverse judgment or (b) the property itself is
immune from legal action.""'
In the first instance, however, a bank litigating against a
sovereign debtor may prevent the debtor from removing the
property from the jurisdiction by attaching it before the judg-
ment. This option is available on any action brought in a federal
district court if allowed by state law.102 However, the outcome
depends on who acts first, the lender or the borrower. The rea-
son is that the assets of foreign financial institutions are usually
very liquid, thus easily transferable, and prudence dictates their
removal overseas by the defendant at the first sign of
litigation. 03
In the second case, a foreign debtor's immunity from at-
tachment is subject to exceptions similar to the jurisdictional ex-
ceptions provided in the FSIA. °'0 Nevertheless, certain assets
enjoy absolute immunity and thus are out of the lenders' reach.
Absolute immunity covers assets such as transfers to a sovereign
state from multilateral organizations,0 5 property destined for
military purposes, 0 and the funds of central banks held for
See Nichols, The Impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on the En-
forcement of Lenders' Remedies, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 251, 257.
101 Id.
102 Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, 66. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
New York law allows attachment of property before judgment in cases where (a) the
debtor is an out of state resident, (b) the debtor is likely to transfer property from the
state, or (c) the cause of action is based on a federal or state judgment that falls within
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 6201
(McKinney 1990).
10' See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case arising out of the same Costa Rican government directive to
suspend foreign exchange payments as Allied Bank. Libra Bank obtained a judgment
against the defendant, but when it tried to execute it the defendant had already trans-
fered its assets out of New York. See Note, Default on Foreign Sovereign Debt, supra
note 71, at 978.
'o See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
'o' 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1987). The code grants immunity to assets owned by organi-
zations such as the IMF and the World Bank.
I" Id. at § 1611(b)(2).
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their own account. 10 7
V. DEBT EXCHANGES: AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO JUDICIAL
REMEDIES
The complexity of issues involved in litigating sovereign de-
faults, as well as the uncertainty of recovering judgments, help
explain why non-judicial remedies are far more attractive to in-
ternational lenders. In the aftermath of the debt crisis, the inter-
national financial community has tried a number of alternatives
with varying degrees of success. Among these alternatives are
debt restructuring agreements, l'0 debt for equity swaps, l09 and,
the focus of this comment, debt for nature swaps."0
Debt restructuring agreements are mechanisms that make
present obligations less burdensome for the debtors by allowing
them to stretch their principal payments."' In some circum-
stances, the restructuring even includes advancing new funds to
allow the debtor to cover interest payments." 2 These agree-
ments are usually negotiated in conjunction with austerity mea-
sures to be implemented by the debtor." 3
A second approach, more attractive to the debtors, is debt
for equity swaps." 4 Debt for equity swaps are transactions that
allow foreign investors to purchase "troubled loans," defined as
107 Id. at § 1611(b)(1). Funds held for a bank's own account are funds used or held
in connection with that bank's expenses, as distinguished from funds used to finance
commercial transactions. See Ryan, note 82, at 127-28.
'08 See generally, Buchheit, The Changing Tactics of Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov., 1987, at 35.
'09 See Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 2 U. ILL. L.
REV. 415, 418-19 (1988); Shepherd & Clock, Regulatory Aspects of Developing Nation
Debt-Equity Swaps, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 43 (1988); Stuber, The Brazilian Debt-Eq-
uity Swap Program, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613 (1989).
1' See Burton, Back to Nature the Financial Way, Banker, Dec. 1988, at 22; Con-
servation Groups Help to Bail Out the Big Banks, 65 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 34 (1988); Using
Red Ink to Keep Tropical Forests Green, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1989, at 48;
Capital Conservation, FORBES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 208.
"' See Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity for Change: A Commentary on the Debt
Restructuring Process, 17 INT'L L. & POL. 612 (1985).
12 This new lending to finance part of the debtor's interest payments is termed
"involuntary" lending. See Kuczynski, The Outlook for Latin American Debt, 66 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 129, 131 (1987).
"' See Henriot & Jameson, International Debt, Austerity, and the Poor, in REKIN-
DLING DEVELOPMENT: MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND WORLD DEBT 13, 23 (Tavis, ed., 1988).
"' See supra note 107.
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loans on which the debtor is experiencing payment difficulties,
at a substantial discount."5 The participating country agrees to
convert the face value of the debt to its own currency and to
disburse these funds to the investor.'1 6 The investor is thereby
allowed to use cheaply obtained debt as "a discounted currency
substitute" to finance projects inside the debtor country.1 1 7
A secondary market, in which dubious Third World obliga-
tions are traded at substantial discounts makes these debt ex-
changes possible." 8 The size of the discount for each sovereign
debt corresponds to the perceived risk that the loans will never
be fully repaid. As is usual for instruments actively traded,
prices fluctuate on a day-to-day basis.119 The following list of
prices for acquiring one dollar of debt, quoted for September,
1989, indicates the range of the discounts: Argentina, 19 cents;
Brazil, 30 cents; Chile, 63 cents; Ecuador, 17 cents; Peru, 5 cents;
Philippines, 50 cents; Poland, 38 cents.120
Debt for equity swaps led, in turn, to the creation of debt
for nature swaps. The principal difference between the two
mechanisms is the specific objective for which each transaction
is authorized by the central bank. In a debt for nature swap or
exchange, a debtor is able to exchange a portion of its foreign
debt for either bonds or cash in its own currency, or for an
agreement to set aside land, all for the specific purpose of carry-
ing out conservation projects.'21 These transactions are attrac-
tive to all the parties involved because, while supporting conser-
vation measures, they "enable a nation to reduce its foreign
debt, and a bank to get troubled loans off its books
permanently.' ' 22
The debt is usually purchased by non-government conserva-
"I Wallenstei & Silkenat, Investment Funds and Debt-Equity Swaps: Broadening
the Base of A New Financial Tool, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 9 (1988).
... Main, A Latin Debt Plan that Might Work, FORTUNE, Apr. 24, 1989, at 212.
... Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 109, at 419.
18 See Truell, Foreign Debt Loans Buoyed by U.S. Debt Strategy, Wall St. J., July
19, 1989, at C1, col. 5.
"9 Secondary Debt Market: Bargain Basement, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1989, at 87.
2 SWAPS, The Newsletter of New Financial Instruments, Vol. 3, No. 10, Oct.
1989, at 12. See also, Secondary Debt Market, A Bargain Basement, ECONOMIST, Mar.
18, 1989, at 87.
121 Burton, Back to Nature the Financial Way, BANKER, Dec., 1988, at 22.
"2 A Debt Swap to Aid Nature, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at D1, col. 3.
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tion groups with funds raised privately for that purpose. 12 The
Bolivian debt for nature agreement of July, 1987, the first such
exchange completed, serves to illustrate the various steps re-
quired in this type of transaction." Washington-based Conser-
vation International purchased $650,000 worth of Bolivian debt
through the offices of Citicorp Investment Bank, using a
$100,000 grant it received from a California foundation. 125 The
cost was, therefore, slightly over fifteen cents for a dollar of
debt. In turn, the Bolivian Government agreed to set aside 3.7
million acres of rain forest in areas adjacent to the existing Beni
Biosphere Reserve. ' It also agreed to place the expanded re-
serve lands under legislative protection, as opposed to a previous
administrative decree, and to establish a trust fund for manage-
ment purposes in the local equivalent of $250,000.27
Contrary to fears that debt for nature exchanges may lead
to the surrender of local sovereignty to foreign institutions, the
Bolivian exchange involved no transfer of land title to outsid-
ers.'2' The Bolivian Government retains ownership of the re-
served areas and administers them in partnership with the Bo-
livian Association for the Conservation of Nature, a private
organization. However, Conservation International does main-
tain a role as coordinator and advisor.'2 9
123 See, e.g. Umafia, Costa Rica's Debt for Nature Swaps Come of Age, Wall St. J.,
May 26, 1989, at All, col. 4.
12 Beautiful Barter in Bolivia, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 26.
125 Id.
12' Id. The Beni Biosphere Reserve is located 150 miles North-East of La Paz. See
Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap for Lower Debt, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1987,
at C2, col. 3.
" See supra note 117, at 442.
"' The International Development and Finance Act of 1989, signed by President
Bush on December 19, 1989, contains a special provision forbidding foreign assistance
organizations from acquiring title to land through debt for nature exchanges. Interna-
tional Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, 103 Stat. 2492 (codi-
fied as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2882). (The Act was sponsored by Senators Joseph Biden,
Richard Lugar and Clairborne Pell). In his statements to the Senate, Senator Biden ex-
plained: "No one in their [sic] right mind would seriously propose that the United States
try to claim ownership of any land through a debt for nature exchange. But there are
always some who will raise ridiculous scenarios to oppose environmental initiatives, so
this provision was included to avoid any question on this issue." 135 CONG. REc. S8464
(daily ed. July 20, 1989).
"29 Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap for Lower Debt, N.Y. Times, July
14, 1987, at C2, col. 3.
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Similar debt for nature transactions have been completed in
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Madagascar, the Philippines and
Zambia."s" The first Costa Rican debt for nature exchange is ex-
plored here as a model for examining these transactions in more
detail. The exchanges concluded thus far in Costa Rica contain
valuable lessons, both in terms of government support and in
the implementation mechanisms Costa Rica has developed, from
which other countries may benefit. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that these lessons must be adjusted to needs and
conditions specific to other countries, leaving ample room for
creative and flexible adaptations.
VI. COSTA RICA AS A CASE MODEL
Costa Rica's experience in implementing debt for nature ex-
changes is an excellent case model for several reasons. First,
with a population of three million, and a foreign debt of $3.7
billion, Costa Rica has one of the highest debt per capita ratios
in the world. 3' Costa Rica's economy and the foreign exchange
130 Negotiations are now in progress for debt for nature swaps in the Dominican
Republic, Argentina and Mexico. Telephone interview with Randall K. Curtis, Director
of Debt Exchanges at The Nature Conservancy, Latin American Division, Washington,
D.C. (Feb. 2, 1990).
In the initial Ecuadorean deal, signed in December, 1987, Ecuador's Fundacion
Natura obtained authorization from the Central Bank to exchange up to $10 million in
debt for local currency bonds. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF-US), drawing on private
donations, bought the first $1 million of debt for $355,400 from Banker's Trust and
transferred it to Fundacion Natura. Pursuant to a Consolidation Agreement, the Central
Bank issued bonds for an equivalent amount in local currency at the official exchange
rate. At maturity, Fundacion Natura will receive the cash value of the bonds. In the
meantime, the interest earned from the bonds will be used to establish and administer
parks and reserves as well as to train personnel. A second $9 million deal was completed
in April, 1989. With assistance from WWF, the Nature Conservancy and the Missouri
Botanical Garden purchased Ecuadorean debt at 11 7/8 cents on the dollar. As in the
previous transaction, the Central Bank issued bonds with a nine year maturity for the
equivalent in local currency. The interest on the bonds is destined to support conserva-
tion efforts in the Galapagos Islands as well as for preservation zones in the Andean and
Amazon regions. See Sevilla, El Canje de Deuda por Conservaci6n en America Latina y
el Caribe, Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (United Nations Envi-
ronmental Program), Quito, Ecu., Feb. 1989, at 14-21. See also Chamberlin, Gruson &
Weltchek, supra note 109, at 443-45; U.S. Conservation Groups and Banks Collaborate
on Mammoth $9 Million Ecuadoran Debt for Nature Swap, Nature Conservancy Press
Release, Apr. 5, 1989; Weisskopf, Ecuador Gets Aid for Debt, Environment, Wash. Post,
Apr. 6, 1989, at 20, col. 6.
"' Umafia, Costa Rica Swaps Debt for Trees, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1987, at 31, col. 4.
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earnings it needs to repay its debt depend almost exclusively on
agriculture and commodity exports.' 32 Second, Costa Rica pos-
sesses probably the richest concentration of plant and animal
life in the world. 133 Third, Costa Rica has created a comprehen-
sive national park system that covers twelve percent of the na-
tion's territory. An additional fifteen percent of its land falls
within other categories of protection such as indian and wildlife
reserves.' Finally, parallel to this geographic protection, Costa
Rica has developed a framework of administrative and legal in-
stitutions that have proven valuable in negotiating and imple-
menting debt exchange agreements.'35
The first Costa Rican debt for nature exchange was ap-
proved by its government in August, 1987 and completed in
February, 1988.136 A brief account of the procedure followed in
this transaction will serve to identify the mechanisms that were
used as well as the various actors involved:
a) The Central Bank of Costa Rica (hereinafter The Central
Bank) approved the exchange of foreign debt for local currency
bonds pursuant to a proposal presented by the Fundacion de
Parques Nacionales (hereinafter National Parks Foundation), a
Costa Rican private organization.13 7 The National Parks Foun-
dation proposal delineated, inter alia, the projects to be funded,
the estimated costs, and the amount of foreign debt to be re-
132 Deficits and Debt Disturb the Peace, EUROMONY, Mar., 1990 (Special Supp.), at
2.
133 Costa Rica's forests are said to contain 208 species of mammals, 850 species of
birds, 160 species of amphibians, 220 species of reptiles, 130 species of fresh water fish,
9,000 species of vascular plants and an estimated 35,000 species of insects. Umafia, Costa
Rica's Fight for the Tropics, BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR, 126, 135 (1990).
I" Id. at 135.
... Id. at 138. See also Tripoli, Costa Rica Halts Assault on Its Fragile Tropical
Forests, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 1989, at 12.
136 Conservation Groups Help to Bail Out the Big Banks, 65 Bus. & Soc. REv. 34, 35
(1988). The second exchange was completed in January, 1989. It involved an additional
purchase of $5.6 million worth of debt at 14 cents for a dollar. Passel, Saving Costa Rica,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at D2, col. 1. Further deals also were completed with donations
from the Dutch and Swedish governments. Umaha, Costa Rica's Debt for Nature Swaps
Come of Age, Wall St. J., May 26, 1989, at All, col. 4. As of February, 1990, the Costa
Rican government had authorized debt for nature exchanges amounting to a total of $86
million of foreign debt redemptions. Telephone interview with Alvaro Umafia, Costa
Rica's Minister for Energy, Mining and Natural Resources (Feb. 7, 1990).
137 Fundacibn de Parques Nacionales, Oferta Canje Deuda Externa, Presentada
Ante el Banco Central de Costa Rica (1989) (on permanent file at PACE Y.B. INT'L L.).
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deemed to fund those projects."8'
b) The Central Bank, the National Parks Foundation, the
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining, and a pri-
vate bank, the Banco Cooperativo de Costa Rica, all entered into
a "Debt for Nature Agreement." This Agreement established the
characteristics and amount of the bonds and the commission
(twenty-five percent) charged by the government. It also desig-
nated Banco Cooperativo as the agent bank to administer the
exchange on behalf of the National Parks Foundation.'3 9
c) Upon completion of the target amount from private do-
nations,"" the National Parks Foundation proceeded to
purchase the debt in the secondary market. A total of $5.4 mil-
lion worth of debt was acquired at a rate of seventeen cents on
the dollar.""
d) Using Banco Cooperativo as agent, the National Parks
Foundation exchanged the debt instruments for Central Bank
bonds. The bonds pay twenty-five percent annual interest and
mature two years later than the original debt.'42 The bonds
themselves are non-negotiable, but can be used as collateral to
obtain local loans. The proceeds of the entire transaction are
then used to fund environmental projects chosen by the donors
138 Id.
139 Ministerio de Industria, Energia y Minas, Acuerdo Entre el Banco Central de
Costa Rica, la Fundacibn de Parques Nacionales, el Ministerio de Industria, Energia y
Minas y el Banco Cooperativo Costaricense, Para la Constitucibn de un Fondo de Con-
servacibn de Recursos Naturales (1987) (on permanent file at PACE Y.B. INT'L L.) For
later debt for nature swaps, however, the Costa Rican government increased its commis-
sion to seventy percent. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 109, at 445 n. 115.
"0 Funds for Costa Rican debt for nature swaps have been donated by, among
others, The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, Conservation International,
Asociacion Ecologica La Pacifica, Pew Charitable Trust, The MacArthur Foundation,
The J.S. Noyes Foundation, Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature, and the
Organization for Tropical Studies. Cody, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Di-
vision, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Debt for Nature Swaps in
Developing Countries: An Overview of Recent Conservation Efforts, at 30 (1988). De-
spite new United States tax regulations favoring such donations, only one United States
bank has thus far donated debt from its Third World portfolio. Cf. Fleet Norstar Do-
nates Latin Debt to Conservancy, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 57, col. 4.
... Cody, supra note 140, at 31.
142 Sevilla, El Canje de Deuda por Conservacibn en America Latina y el Caribe,
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (United Nations Environ-
mental Program), Quito, Ecu., Feb. 1989, at 14-21.
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in coordination with the National Parks Foundation. 14 3
Costa Rica's successful experience with several debt for na-
ture swaps illustrates that the initiative and the administrative
structure needed to obtain the maximum benefit from these
transactions must come from debtor countries. Only the debtor
countries can decide the conditions on which they are willing to
let outside organizations utilize their financial systems and influ-
ence what would otherwise be sovereign matters. 14  The admin-
istrative structures are also important for pragmatic reasons.
Debt for nature exchanges would not be nearly as fruitful if the
task of implementing them fell to competing administrative
agencies lacking clear guidelines for conservation programs.
In this respect, Costa Rica's former President Oscar Arias
provided unsurpassed leadership. Under his tutelage, the na-
tion's administration of environmental protection was elevated
to a ministerial level with its own resources and a well-defined
agenda. 14 5 President Arias also supported legislative action
aimed at conservation, and favored an increasing use of easily
adaptable technology for tapping natural resources. 4 '
143 See Fundaci6n de Parques Nacionales, Informe de Donaciones Correspondientes
a 1988, San Jos6, Costa Rica, 1989, at 11-24 (on permanent file at PACE Y.B. INT'L L.).
The money made available by debt for nature swaps in Costa Rica has been used to
sponsor a number of conservation projects ranging from a $2 million land acquisition
(Megapark Project) to training programs costing less than $1,000 each.
Among the projects currently funded are:
1. Tortuguero National Park. The Tortuguero beaches are nesting grounds for vari-
ous endangered species of marine turtles. The Parks Foundation now has a protection
program that includes scientific research, purchase of beaches, and education programs
to increase awareness by adjacent populations (including an annual "turtle festival").
2. Grandoca Land Management Project. This project aims to slow deforestation and
to support sustainable development through organization of plant nurseries, land tilting
and creation of a national park.
3. Talamaca Complex. These are two national parks located on the border with Pan-
ama. These parks contain the greatest biological wealth in the region, with many inter-
locking habitats that include paramos, swamps, oak forests and fern groves. Funds are
allocated to build conservation facilities and to help prevent poaching and deforestation.
Id.
144 Cf. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 109, at 447.
145 This is the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines. See Fuller & Wil-
liamson, Debt for Nature Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation in Developing
Nations, in INT'L ENV'T REPORTER (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, ed.), May 11, 1988, at 302.
146 See Sun, Costa Rica's Campaign for Conservation, 239 SCIENCE 1366, 1367 (Mar.
18, 1988). On the subject of appropriate technology for the developing countries see
Salam, What the Third World Really Needs, 44 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 8
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The recipient country's legal and administrative support is
important for still another reason: It helps the international con-
servation organizations in their fund-raising activities. In order
to avoid accusations of foreign domination these organizations
must relinquish control of the donated funds, yet they must also
"be able to vouchsafe to domestic donors and tax authorities the
continuing responsible use of these funds. 1 7
The importance of allaying any fears of foreign domination
in the recipient countries can hardly be exaggerated. Brazil pro-
vides the best example of the critical role such fears can play.14 8
Brazil, a country with one of the highest foreign debts in the
world ($115 billion)149 and holding the largest tract of rain forest
of any nation,' s5 could well be a leader in debt for nature trans-
actions. Yet no such transaction has been negotiated thus far.
Debt for nature exchanges have been pictured by segments
of the Brazilian government and press as schemes by the indus-
trialized nations "intended to hold back its [Brazil's] develop-
ment." 5' Former President Jos6 Sarney specifically said that
debt for nature swaps will not be considered in Brazil and
warned that such international concern for its Amazon programs
could lead to "a new colonial system."' 52 President Sarney's For-
eign Minister made further assertions to the effect that what the
international ecologists intended was to make Brazil an ecologi-
cal reserve. 153 Thus, emotions ran high and the issue became
ripe political capital for a number of public figures. One of these,
(Nov. 1988); The Slow March of Technology, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1990, at 79. For an
exposition of the environmental benefits of alleviating the debt problem of the develop-
ing countries see Arias, For the Globe's Sake, Debt Relief, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1989, at
A29, col. 1.
147 von Moltke, Debt for Nature: An Overview, World Wildlife Fund Press Release,
at 1, col. 2.
148 See Cohen, U.S. Complaints on Amazon Destruction Spur Brazil's Resentment
and Defiance, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at A10, col. 1; Brooke, Brazil Wants Foreign
Aid to Fight Pollution, But No Strings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
'4' Main, A Latin Debt Plan that Might Work, FORTUNE, Apr. 24, 1989, at 205.
180 Brazil's forest basin has a surface of 1.9 million square miles. See Brooke, Brazil
Announces Plan to Protect the Amazon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
151 It's Our Forest to Burn If We Want To, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 42.
1 Brooke, Brazil Wants Foreign Aid to Fight Pollution, But No Strings, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
... Moran, Un Anthropologue Rtonn: Le Plus Grand Gaspillage de l'Histoire
Humaine, L'Humanitd, Apr. 14, 1989 (Paris, Fr.).
1990]
27
PACE YB. INT'L L. [Vol. 2:135
the mayor of the western city of Ariquemes, demonstrated his
contempt for United States conservation initiatives by saying
that while Americans burned Vietnam's forests with napalm and
other bombs, they now wanted to clear their consciences by
blocking the development of Brazil.1
54
These sensitivities over sovereignty may be difficult to dis-
pel, particularly because Brazil's development plans consider the
Amazon "the natural hinterland for its expansion."'' 3 However,
there is hope that the new administration of President Collor de
Mello may decide to take advantage of debt for nature ex-
changes as it sees the benefits that some of Brazil's neighbors
have obtained without compromising their own sovereignty.1
56
VII. THE OUTLOOK FOR DEBT FOR NATURE EXCHANGES
Since the first transaction took place in 1987, Congress has
given debt for nature exchanges considerable attention and sup-
port. A specific example of that support is the International De-
velopment and Finance Act of 1989, 57 signed by President Bush
on December 19, 1989. The Act authorizes multilateral develop-
ment banks and United States relief agencies to use American
foreign aid to carry out debt for nature exchanges."'
"' Brooke, supra note 152. See also Mobilisation Internationale Pour la Protection
de la Nature: Br~sil, le sort de la for~t amazonienne suscite un &pre dbat, Le Monde,
Mar. 9, 1989, at 3 (Paris, Fr.).
... Cohen, U.S. Complaints on Amazon Destruction Spur Brazil's Resentment and
Defiance, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at 10, col. 1.
"' Brazil has also been under pressure from other Latin American countries to im-
prove its conservation efforts. Shortly before President Sarney was to announce his own
rain forest plan, a group of leading Latin American intellectuals issued an open letter
accusing him of "ecocide" and asking him to stop massive deforestation of the Amazon.
Among the signers were Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia MArquez of Colombia, Carlos
Fuentes of Mexico and Mario Vargas Llosa of Peru. Serrill, A Dubious Plan for the
Amazon, Time, Apr. 17, 1989, at 67.
117 Pub. L. No. 101-240, 103 Stat. 2492 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2881).
"" The Act directs the multilateral development banks to create a department that
will:
(A) be responsible for environmental protection and resource conservation, includ-
ing support for restoration, protection and sustainable use policies; (B) develop
and monitor strict environmental guidelines and policies to govern lending activi-
ties; and (C) actively promote, coordinate and facilitate debt for nature exchanges
and the restauration, protection and sustainable use of tropical forests, renewable
natural resources, endangered ecosystems and species in debtor countries.
Id. at § 512 (a)(1) (emphasis added).
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The International Development and Finance Act is compre-
hensive legislation that sets clear environmental guidelines for
relief and development projects around the globe.159 It encour-
ages the recipient countries to adopt sustainable forms of ex-
ploitation, defined as those that "promote the maintenance and
restoration of soils, vegetation, hydrological cycles, wildlife, criti-
cal ecosystems (tropical forests, wetlands and coastal marine re-
sources), biological diversity and other natural resources essen-
tial to economic growth and human well-being .. ."1"
These guidelines are expected to have a sizable impact on
world conservation efforts. Not only will they make more funds
available for debt for nature exchanges, but they are also likely
to prevent funding of environmentally destructive development
projects by international relief organizations. 161
Although the International Development Finance Act estab-
lishes a positive United States policy toward debt for nature ex-
changes, their increased utilization faces several limitations. One
such limitation lays in potential changes in the secondary mar-
ket itself. Debt for nature exchanges can continue only as long
as banks are willing to sell their loans. Yet, because every loan
redeemed leaves fewer loans outstanding, the debt leverage of
the Third World will improve as the number of debt exchanges
increases. This improved debt leverage will lower sovereign risk.
As a result, the secondary market prices may either be too high,
and thus unattractive to the conservation groups, or it may dis-
appear altogether.'1 6 However, there is no indication that these
changes will occur in the near future. The sheer magnitude of
"I The Act calls on the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the multilateral banks to
"support and encourage the approval of multilateral development bank loans which in-
clude provisions that foster and facilitate the implementation of a sound and effective
environmental policy in the borrowing country. Id. at § 512 (a)(2 ).
100 Id. at § 512 (b)(4).
"' The Grand Carajfis Project in Brazil, for example, a complex of pig iron smelters
funded by the World Bank, will require the burning of thousands of acres of forest a year
for the production of charcoal. The steel production, 90 percent of which is to be ex-
ported, "will not be profitable if it had to include systematic reforestation." Ruellan, Le
Projet du Grand Carajds au Brbsil, un Saccage Lucratif des For&ts, Le Monde Diplo-
matique, Sept. 1989, at 3 (Paris, Fr.).
For a broad study of the destructiveness of development projects funded by interna-
tional relief organizations see GRAHAM HANCOCK, THE LORDS OF POVERTY (1989).
182 See.A Debtor's Dream, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1988, at 81.
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the Third World debt, $1.2 trillion, makes the secondary mar-
ket a necessary outlet for dubious loans and assures that mar-
ket's continued existence.
Fund raising is another limiting factor. Although govern-
ment participation is now increasing, as the International Devel-
opment and Finance Act of 1989 and contributions from the
Dutch and Swedish governments demonstrate," 4 the bulk of the
funding to purchase LDC debt comes from private institutions.
The main participants in fund-raising activities thus far are the
private international conservation organizations. However, these
organizations have their own size and personnel limitations as
well as competing projects to attend. Furthermore, as the num-
ber of countries willing to participate in debt for nature ex-
changes increases, the available share of donations decreases,
and otherwise attractive conservation projects must go
unfunded.
The other logical candidates to supplement these fund-rais-
ing activities are the major international lenders. Lenders can
donate portions of their non-performing loans either to the in-
ternational conservation groups or, within the framework of debt
for nature agreements, directly to LDCs. With the single excep-
tion of one regional bank's donation of Costa Rican debt, how-
ever, such options have been universally rejected by lenders. 5
There are two important reasons for this rejection. First,
banks do not want to promote the notion that they are willing to
forgive foreign debt. Their shareholders are unlikely to support
such actions because of their negative balance sheet impact.
Banks also fear that loan forgiveness may disrupt the fragile re-
payment agreement already reached with some debtors and per-
haps even promote further defaults. Second, there are few finan-
163 Conservation Groups Help to Bail Out the Big Banks, 65 Bus. & Soc. REV. 34
(1988).
164 Umafia, Costa Rica's Debt for Nature Swaps Come of Age, Wall St. J., May 26,
1989, at All, col. 4.
'65 This was a $254,000 donation from the Fleet National Bank of Rhode Island. See
Fleet/Norstar Donates Latin Debt to Conservancy, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at A57, col.
4. Contrary to original press coverage, however, this donation was not done for tax relief
purposes. According to Fleet's President William J. Penn, "Fleet's earnings position was
such that a charitable deduction was not required for purposes of its financial state-
ments." Dionne, Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue Ruling on Debt for Nature
Swaps Liberally, 1988 Tax Notes, at 308.
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cial incentives for banks to make debt donations. This is still the
case despite a 1987 Internal Revenue Service Ruling declaring
that banks could deduct from taxes the full face value-not just
the fair market value, as previously held-of any debt donated
to a charitable organization. 6 Banks still conclude that it is
more attractive to sell their high risk debt in the secondary mar-
ket than to donate it in order to take advantage of the allowed
tax deductions.16 7
Finally, donors and other supporters of these exchanges
want assurances that debt for nature agreements contain suffi-
cient safeguards to deter violations by the recipient countries.
Donors fear that once a government has had portions of its for-
eign debt cancelled it might withdraw its support for specific en-
vironmental projects, particularly in the face of mounting politi-
cal or economic pressure. In view of the usually low status that
developing countries give to their own agencies in charge of con-
servation and the general lack of local environmental protection
laws, those fears are not unreasonable.
Although a recipient country can always raise issues of sov-
ereignty to foreclose internal remedies sought by the sponsors,
several interlocking factors still protect debt for nature ex-
changes. Recipient countries, for example, continue to receive
direct funding for other projects long after the debt exchange
transaction is concluded. Consequently, countries may have
more to lose in the long run by violating their agreements than
whatever short-term gains they may obtain from such conduct.
On the other hand, sponsors of debt for nature exchanges rely
on long-term working relationships with local nongovernmental
conservation organizations. These organizations usually have ac-
tive constituencies and dedicated staff members who, together
168 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987 C.B. 205. The Treasury Department clarified that the
Ruling will be interpreted liberally, and that either foreign currency or foreign currency-
denominated bonds may be exchanged for the LDC debt. See Dionne, supra note 158, at
307. But see Halperin, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation of
Debt for Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721 (1989) (too many legal contortions
required to justify the interpretation given by the Treasury.)
'" According to the present United States tax laws, a lender donating debt worth
one dollar will get a maximum tax credit of 34 cents. If the lender sells the debt in the
secondary market for 35 cents, however, it will get the 35 cents cash plus a 22 cents tax
credit (on the loss of 65 cents), for a total of 57 cents. See Burton, Back to Nature the
Financial Way, BANKER, Dec. 1988, at 23.
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with the international groups, present a wide-ranging public
opinion barrier to government violations. The local environmen-
tal groups also can seek redress through various areas of national
law (for example, tort, contract or property law), which are less
readily available to international groups.
IX. CONCLUSION
Debt for nature exchanges represent a unique opportunity
to alleviate two of the most fundamental problems of the world
today: Third World debt and the destruction of rain forests.
These exchanges allow the recipient countries to attain sustaina-
ble utilization of their natural resources and to pursue conserva-
tion projects they could not otherwise afford. Furthermore, even
if direct reduction of foreign debt is minimal, the conversion of
hard currency obligations to local currency relieves economic
pressures on the debtors. Reduction of economic pressure will, in
turn, improve the possibility of repayment for the rest of the
debt, a direct benefit to international lenders for whom judicial
remedies for sovereign defaults are highly costly and uncertain.
Of all the actors involved in debt for nature exchanges, the
recipient countries play the most important role. These coun-
tries must take the initiative by establishing legal and adminis-
trative structures that will lend credibility to their conservation
objectives. Such structures are important not only for an effi-
cient implementation of the programs themselves, but also be-
cause sponsoring international organizations require assurances
that once they relinquish control of the funds no deviations from
the initial goals will occur.
Debt for nature exchanges are essentially banking transac-
tions. Yet, the mere availability of banking mechanisms does not
guarantee their efficient use. The international financial commu-
nity can play an active role in these exchanges even if debt do-
nation is not a viable option for them. The advisory services that
some banks have rendered to conservation groups could be ex-
panded to provide technical data to debtors and to assist in
identifying debt exchange opportunities. In addition, multina-
tional banks could pursue the elimination of negative pledges in
their syndication loans as well as in their restructuring agree-
ments, thereby freeing new portions of debt to enter the second-
ary market.
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Even under the most favorable circumstances, debt for na-
ture exchanges themselves are at most only a small step in solv-
ing the extensive problems of the Third World. Their existence,
however, has great significance in changing perceptions of these
problems and in making new kinds of solutions available. Debt
exchanges improve the ratio between expenditures and true im-
pact in the recipient country. They can also provide the founda-
tion for better conservation policies within these countries, and
they may lead to the adoption of debt repayment strategies com-
patible with the preservation of the rain forests.
Most importantly, debt for nature exchanges may make the
industrialized world aware of the intricate relationship between
the economic plight of developing countries and the destructive
exploitation of their natural resources.
Jos6 0. Castafieda
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